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ABSTRACT 21 
Human subjects of both sexes were asked to make a perceptual decision between multiple directions of 22 
visual motion. In addition to reporting a primary choice, they also had to report a second guess, 23 
indicating which of the remaining options they would rather bet on, assuming that they got their 24 
primary choice wrong. The second guess was clearly informed by the amounts of sensory evidence that 25 
were provided for the different options. A single computational integration-to-threshold model, based 26 
on the assumption that the second guess is determined by the rank ordering of accumulated evidence at 27 
or shortly after the time of the decision, was able to explain the distribution of primary choices, 28 
associated response times, and the distribution of second guesses. This suggests that the decisionmaker 29 
has access to how well supported unchosen options are by the sensory evidence. 30 
 31 
SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT 32 
Perceptual decisions require conversion of sensory evidence into a discrete choice. Computational 33 
models based on the accumulation of evidence to a decision threshold can explain the distribution of 34 
choices and associated decision times. Subjects are also able to report the level of confidence in their 35 
decision. Here we show that, when making decisions between more than two alternatives, the 36 
decisionmaker can even report a second guess that is clearly informed by the sensory evidence. These 37 
second guesses show a distribution that is consistent with subjects having access to how much sensory 38 
evidence was accumulated for the unchosen options. The decisionmaker therefore has knowledge about 39 
the outcome of the decision process that goes beyond just the choice and an associated confidence. 40 
 41 
  42 
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INTRODUCTION 43 
Perceptual decisions require a decisionmaker to make a discrete choice on the basis of sensory 44 
information. Substantial work has gone into elucidating the mechanisms that allow the inflowing 45 
sensory evidence to be converted into a discrete choice. Integration-to-threshold mechanisms are the 46 
currently dominant class of models, the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) being a popular exemplar (Luce, 47 
1986; Ditterich, 2006; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ditterich, 2010; Forstmann et al., 2016). These models 48 
are based on the idea that sensory evidence for each available option is accumulated until the 49 
accumulated evidence for one of the options exceeds a decision threshold. They can explain the 50 
distribution of choices and associated response times (RTs) for a wide range of decision tasks (Ratcliff 51 
and Smith, 2004) and are consistent with decision-related neural activity, both averaged across trials as 52 
well as on a single-trial level (Ditterich, 2006; Bollimunta et al., 2012). It is difficult, however, to pinpoint 53 
experimentally how much temporal integration is involved in the process (Ditterich, 2006), and the view 54 
that single-trial decision-related neural activity is consistent with a diffusion-like process has been 55 
challenged (Latimer et al., 2015). 56 
More recently, confidence in a perceptual decision has become the focus of scientific investigation. 57 
Some studies suggest that a common mechanism could explain both the outcome of the decision as well 58 
as the reported confidence (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kiani et al., 2014), while other reports have 59 
focused on dissociations between subjective confidence and objective decision accuracy (see Rahnev 60 
and Denison (2018) for a review). When making binary decisions, the choice and the associated 61 
confidence fully describe the outcome of the decision process. When making decisions between more 62 
than two alternatives, the decisionmaker could also have knowledge about how well the sensory 63 
evidence supported the unchosen options. 64 
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Here we ask whether human subjects have access to information about the “relative desirability” of the 65 
unchosen options when making perceptual decisions between more than two alternatives and, if so, 66 
whether one can provide a quantitative explanation for the distribution of reported second guesses. We 67 
used a modified version of the 3-alternative forced choice (3AFC) version of the multi-component 68 
Random Dot Motion (RDM) direction discrimination task introduced in Niwa and Ditterich (2008). 69 
Briefly, the subject watches an RDM stimulus that simultaneously contains coherent motion in three 70 
different directions, all separated by 120 deg. The strength of each motion component is chosen 71 
randomly. The observer has to determine the strongest motion component and indicate its direction 72 
with an eye movement. The choice and the associated RT are recorded. For this study, subjects were 73 
instructed to also report a second guess with a second eye movement. We asked the observers to 74 
indicate which of the remaining two options they would rather bet on, assuming they got their primary 75 
choice wrong. Once both the primary choice and the second guess had been registered, auditory 76 
feedback about the accuracy of the primary choice was provided. Subjects did not receive feedback on 77 
their second guess. The task is illustrated in Figure 1. Further details regarding the experimental design 78 
can be found in Materials and Methods. 79 
Here we demonstrate that the second guess is clearly informed by the sensory evidence and that a 80 
single integration-to-threshold model can explain the distribution of primary choices, associated RTs, 81 
and the distribution of second guesses. This suggests that the decisionmaker has access to how much 82 
sensory evidence had been accumulated for options other than the chosen one at the time when the 83 
decision was made. We also consider alternative models and show that the second-best explanation for 84 
the data is provided by a model that starts a new decision process between the remaining alternatives 85 
when the primary decision is made and reads out the decision variable after a fixed amount of time. 86 
 87 
88 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 89 
Experimental Design and Statistical Analyses 90 
Human Subjects 91 
The study was approved by the UC Davis Institutional Review Board. After giving their informed consent, 92 
seven UC Davis undergraduate students (4 females, 3 males) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 93 
participated in the experiment. Each of the subjects completed at least five experimental sessions with a 94 
minimum of 300 valid decision trials each. 95 
 96 
Experimental Setup 97 
The subjects sat in front of a 22” flat-screen CRT video monitor (ViewSonic P225f; viewing distance: 98 
60 cm) with their head on a chin and forehead rest. The visual stimuli were generated by a Macintosh 99 
G4 computer running Mac OS 9, MATLAB (The Mathworks, Natick, MA), and the Psychophysics Toolbox 100 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) at a frame rate of 75 Hz. The experiment was controlled and the data were 101 
collected by an Intel Pentium IV computer running QNX (Ottawa, ON, Canada) and a modified version of 102 
REX (Laboratory of Sensorimotor Research, National Eye Institute). 103 
Eye movements were monitored using a monocular IR video eye tracker with chinrest-mounted optics 104 
(Series 5000, Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA) operating at 240 Hz. Prior to each 105 
experimental session the eye tracker was calibrated using repeated fixation of nine calibration targets 106 
with horizontal eccentricities of -10, 0, and +10 deg and vertical eccentricities of -7.5, 0, and +7.5 deg. 107 
 108 
  109 
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Experimental Task and Visual Stimulus 110 
The experimental task is illustrated in Fig. 1. Each trial started with the presentation of a central fixation 111 
mark (diameter: 0.3 deg). The measured fixation location had to remain within 2.5 deg of the center of 112 
the screen throughout the trial (up to the saccadic response). After 250 to 500 ms of stable fixation, 113 
three targets (diameter: 0.5 deg) appeared on the screen, all located on a virtual circle around the 114 
fixation mark with a radius of 8.0 deg. The target locations were chosen randomly (with equal spacing) 115 
at the beginning of an experimental sessions and did not change throughout the session. After another 116 
random delay of 250 to 500 ms, a multi-component random-dot pattern was presented at the center of 117 
the screen (diameter: 5.0 deg). 118 
In the original version of the stimulus (as used, e.g., in Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman 119 
and Shadlen, 2002; Palmer et al., 2005) a certain fraction of the dots (defined as the coherence of the 120 
stimulus) was moving coherently in a particular direction, whereas the remaining dots were flickering 121 
randomly. Our multi-component random-dot pattern had up to three coherent motion components 122 
embedded. Thus, there were four subpopulations of dots: one was moving coherently in a particular 123 
direction   (aligned with one of the choice targets; fraction of dots defined by the coherence of the first 124 
component), another one was moving coherently in the direction 120 +  (fraction defined by the 125 
coherence of the second component), a third one was moving coherently in the direction 240 +  126 
(fraction defined by the coherence of the third component), and the remaining dots were flickering 127 
randomly. The stimulus is therefore described by a set of three coherences. Which of the four 128 
subpopulations a particular dot belonged to, changed randomly over time. As a consequence, the 129 
stimulus is not perceived as an overlay of several transparent layers of motion that could be easily 130 
separated, but as a mixture of different motion components. See, e.g., Treue et al. (2000) for a 131 
discussion of transparent random-dot motion stimuli. Corresponding pairs of dots, responsible for the 132 
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percept of apparent motion, were presented with a temporal separation of 40 ms (3 video frames). The 133 
coherently moving dots had a speed of 6 deg/s, the dot density was 
2
16.7
deg
dots
s
, and each dot was a 134 
little filled square with an edge length of 0.1 deg. On each trial, the set of coherences was randomly 135 
selected from a list of 51 possible coherence combinations ranging from 0 to 40% each. The full list can 136 
be found in Table 1.  137 
 138 
The subjects were instructed to identify the direction of the strongest motion component and to make a 139 
saccadic eye movement to the associated choice target (aligned with the identified direction of motion). 140 
They were allowed to watch the stimulus for as long as they wanted (up to 5 s) and to respond 141 
whenever they were ready. The motion stimulus disappeared from the screen as soon as the eye left the 142 
central fixation window. Subjects were further instructed to indicate with a second saccadic eye 143 
movement to one of the two remaining choice targets, which of the remaining options they would 144 
rather bet on as a second guess, assuming they got their first choice wrong. After each trial they 145 
received auditory feedback as to whether they had picked the correct target in their primary choice. In 146 
case the stimulus did not have one strongest motion component, the computer randomly identified one 147 
of the targets as being the correct one. No feedback was given on the second guess. 148 
In order to complete a trial successfully (“valid trial”), the subject had to maintain accurate fixation until 149 
the random-dot pattern appeared. Once central fixation was broken, the eye position had to be within 150 
3 deg of one of the three choice targets within 100 ms and had to stay on this target (primary choice) for 151 
at least 200 ms. At this point, a neutral sound was played, indicating that the primary choice had been 152 
registered, but not providing any information about its accuracy yet. At most 3 s later, the eye position 153 
had to be within 3 deg of one of the remaining choice targets and had to stay on this target (second 154 
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guess) for at least 200 ms. At this point, auditory feedback was given about the accuracy of the primary 155 
choice, which indicated to the subject that the trial had been registered as a valid trial. 156 
 157 
Data Analysis 158 
For analyzing the data, we collapsed across different target locations. Thus, we only worked with the 15 159 
unique sets of coherences (eliminating the permutations) and whether the subject picked the target 160 
associated with the strongest motion component, the one associated with the intermediate component, 161 
or the one associated with the weakest component. We analyzed the pooled data across subjects to 162 
have a robust number of trials for each experimental condition. Since we only work with mean RTs in 163 
this study, we were not concerned about variability in RT across subjects potentially affecting the shape 164 
of RT distributions.  165 
RT was defined as the time between the appearance of the random-dot stimulus and the breaking of 166 
central fixation. We did not analyze the timing of the second guess as subjects had to wait for their 167 
primary choice to be registered by the computer before they could report their second guess. Thus, the 168 
timing of the second guess was largely externally imposed. 169 
 170 
Computational Models 171 
Model of the neural representation of the sensory stimulus 172 
The mean response of a population of motion-sensitive neurons to a 3-component random-dot stimulus 173 
with coherences 1c  (in the preferred direction of the pool), 2c , and 3c  was modeled to be of the form 174 
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 175 
where g  is the overall gain of the sensory response (relationship between neural activity and motion 176 
strength). The two additive terms in the brackets reflect the two linear response components: the first 177 
describes the response to the coherent motion in the preferred direction, the second describes the 178 
response to the noise dots. The term in parenthesis reflects the proportion of noise dots in the stimulus. 179 
nk  is the relative gain of the response to the noise dots compared to the response to an identical 180 
fraction of dots moving coherently in the preferred direction. The term in the denominator reflects the 181 
divisive normalization. Since the term in the numerator accurately describes the response to a single-182 
component stimulus, only the coherences of motion components with directions other than the 183 
preferred one are present in the denominator. For simplicity, we have chosen a linear term, with sk  184 
describing the gain/strength of the divisive normalization (Niwa and Ditterich, 2008). 185 
In general, the mean responses of each of the three task-relevant sensory pools can be written as 186 
 
3
1
1
1
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j
s i
i j
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s
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
 187 
The variances of the three sensory responses were modeled as 188 
 2
js v j
k s =   189 
We described the outputs of the sensory pools as normal random processes to be able to treat the 190 
decision process as a standard diffusion process (based on Brownian motion), which is reasonable if the 191 
pools are not too small. 192 
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 193 
Model of the decision process 194 
In principle, we would have to treat the race between the three integrators mathematically as a 195 
3-dimensional diffusion process. However, for the 2AFC case, the decision process has often been 196 
described as a 1-dimensional diffusion process with two boundaries instead of a 2-dimensional diffusion 197 
process. This simplification can be done when one assumes that the two signals that are accumulated by 198 
the two integrators are only different in sign, but identical in absolute value. Such a situation would 199 
result from all of the contributions that a particular pool of sensory neurons makes to the net evidence 200 
signals having the same origin. If we make the same assumption in our model, we can also reduce the 201 
dimensionality of the problem. We can write the three evidence signals as 202 
 
1 1
1 1 2 32 2
1 1
2 2 1 32 2
1 1
3 3 1 22 2
e s s s
e s s s
e s s s
= − −
= − −
= − −
 203 
3e  can be rewritten as 204 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 13 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 22 2 2 2e s s s s s s e e= − − − − − − = − −  205 
Thus, if 1e  and 2e  are known, 3e  is known. In our model, each of the three evidence signals is integrated 206 
over time (see Fig. 2): 207 
 ( ) ( )
0
t
j ji t e d =   208 
Since integration is a linear operation, if 1i  and 2i  are known, 3i  is also known. We can therefore rewrite 209 
the decision criterion for choosing the 3rd alternative: 210 
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1 2
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1
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
− − 
 − −
 211 
Thus, the third integrator exceeding a value of 1 is equivalent to crossing another linear boundary in the 212 
1i - 2i  plane (for an illustration see Niwa and Ditterich (2008), Fig. 3C). The diffusion process always starts 213 
at (0;0) and stops when one of the three boundaries is crossed: 1 1i =  is the decision boundary for the 214 
1st alternative, 2 1i =  is the boundary for the 2
nd alternative, and 2 1 1i i= − −  is the boundary for the 3
rd 215 
alternative. 216 
The 2-dimensional diffusion process is described by a drift vector and a covariance matrix. The drift 217 
vector is given by 
1
2
e
e
 
 
  
, the means of the first two evidence signals. Since 
1
2
e
e
 
 
 
 can be calculated as 218 
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 221 
The covariance matrix   can be calculated as 222 
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 224 
Model of the second choice based on accumulated evidence at or shortly after the time of the first 225 
threshold crossing 226 
The integrator crossing the decision threshold first determines the primary choice and the decision time. 227 
We propose that the state of the remaining integrators at the time when the winning integrator crosses 228 
threshold can be used to determine the second guess. The higher value of the two remaining integrators 229 
determines the second choice. For example, if the second integrator crossed the threshold first, the 230 
states of the first and the third integrator at this particular time would be compared, and the larger 231 
value would determine the second guess. As pointed out above, when working with a 2-dimensional 232 
stochastic process, the two dimensions correspond to the states of the first two integrators. The state of 233 
the third integrator can be calculated as 3 1 2i i i= − − . 234 
While the first passage time problem could be solved numerically (see Ditterich, 2006, section B.5 and 235 
Niwa and Ditterich, 2008), we also needed the predictions for the distribution of second choices. 236 
Therefore, we discretized the 2-dimensional diffusion process (time step: 5 ms) and simulated 50,000 237 
trials per experimental condition. The MATLAB function OU_2D_3B_SIM_SC.M, which has been used for 238 
performing the model calculations, is part of the Stochastic Integration Modeling Toolbox (SIMT; written 239 
by JD), which can be downloaded from https://www.github.com/peractionlab/StochInt. 240 
13 
 
To determine whether the second guess might have been informed by sensory evidence that arrived at 241 
the decision process after the decision threshold had been crossed, we allowed the integration process 242 
to continue for a fixed amount of time after the threshold crossing and then read out and compared the 243 
states of the integrators that had not won the race to threshold. The MATLAB function used for this 244 
purpose, OU_2D_3B_SIM_SC_ADD_TIME.M, is also part of SIMT. To quantify the deviation between 245 
predicted and observed second guesses, we calculated the sum of the squared differences between 246 
predicted and observed relative frequencies. 247 
 248 
Model of the second choice based on two successive threshold crossings 249 
We also considered a model where the integration process continues after the first threshold crossing, 250 
until a second (different) bound is crossed. The first threshold crossing determines the first choice, the 251 
second threshold crossing the second choice and the decision time. In contrast to our original model, to 252 
give this model more flexibility, the integration of sensory evidence was allowed to be leaky (the time 253 
constant of integration was an additional free model parameter), and the bounds were allowed to 254 
collapse over time. We used the same logistic function as in Ditterich (2006): 255 
 
( )( )
( )
( )
exp1
( )
1 exp1 exp
s d
A t
s ds t d
− 
= +
+ − +  −
  256 
t  is the time into the decision process, and s  and d  are two additional free model parameters that 257 
define the shape (slope) and the position (delay) of the collapsing bound. The MATLAB function 258 
OU_2D_3B_TWO_CROSS_SIM.M, which was used for evaluating this model, is also part of SIMT. 259 
 260 
  261 
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Models of the second choice based on two successive decision processes 262 
Another class of models involved starting a new decision process when the first threshold crossing 263 
occurred, but only between the two alternatives that did not win the original race to threshold. For 264 
example, assuming that 2i  crossed the threshold first, the second process would be set up as 265 
 
1 1 3
2 3 1
e s s
e s s
 = −
 = −
  266 
If the integral of the first evidence signal crossed the threshold first, Direction 1 would be reported as 267 
the second choice. If the integral of the second evidence signal crossed the threshold first, Direction 3 268 
would be reported as the second choice. Since 2 1e e = − , this second decision process can be treated as 269 
a 1-dimensional drift-diffusion process with two boundaries. The decision time would be the total 270 
duration of both decision processes. To give this model more flexibility, we allowed the decision 271 
threshold of the second decision process to be lower than the decision threshold of the first decision 272 
process. The second decision threshold was an additional free model parameter. The MATLAB function 273 
OU_2D_3B_1D_2B_SIM_SC.M, which has been used for evaluating this model, is also part of SIMT. 274 
Finally, we considered a model that also starts a second decision process when the first threshold 275 
crossing occurs, but it does not wait for a second threshold crossing. The second decision process 276 
unfolds for a fixed amount of time and is then read out. The sign of the current state of the integrated 277 
evidence (of the 1D process) determines the second choice. The MATLAB function 278 
OU_2D_3B_1D_FIXED_TIME_SIM_SC.M, which was used for evaluating this model, is also part of SIMT. 279 
 280 
  281 
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Model Fit 282 
The model parameters were identified by an optimization procedure based on the mean RTs. A 283 
combination of a global pattern search (provided by MATLAB’s Global Optimization Toolbox) and a 284 
multi-dimensional simplex algorithm (provided by MATLAB’s Optimization Toolbox) was used to 285 
minimize the sum of the squared differences between the mean RTs in the data and the mean RTs 286 
predicted by the model, taking the standard errors of the estimated means into account. We used the 287 
mean RTs for each combination of coherences, regardless of choice (15 data points). For the model 288 
these were obtained by calculating a weighted sum of the predicted mean RTs for the different choices 289 
based on the predicted probabilities of these choices. 290 
 291 
RESULTS 292 
We used 11,060 valid decision trials from seven subjects for analysis and modeling. The overall accuracy 293 
of the primary choice was 72% (chance level would be 33% for a 3AFC task), which provided us with 294 
7,951 correct trials and 3,109 error trials for further analysis. How the primary choice and the associated 295 
RT depended on the presented stimulus was similar to what we had reported in Niwa and 296 
Ditterich (2008) and will be presented in the context of a computational model below. 297 
 298 
Second guesses in perceptual decision-making are informed by sensory evidence 299 
To test whether subjects are able to make an informed second guess, we analyzed the error trials and 300 
quantified how often subjects reported what would have been the correct choice as their second guess. 301 
If subjects just guessed randomly, this should not deviate significantly from chance (50%). The correct 302 
option, however, was reported as the second guess in 63% of the error trials, which is highly significantly 303 
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above chance (p < 10-6; binomial test). This indicates that the second guess was clearly informed by the 304 
sensory evidence provided by the motion stimulus. 305 
 306 
A computational model that can explain primary choices and associated RTs 307 
To gain more insight into what information the second guesses were based on, we resorted to 308 
computational modeling. In Niwa and Ditterich (2008) we presented an integration-to-threshold model 309 
that was able to explain the distribution of choices in the 3-choice multi-component RDM direction 310 
discrimination task as well as the associated RTs. Briefly, in a stochastic process, we modeled three pools 311 
of motion-sensitive neurons (for each of the possible directions). Each of these pools had a strong linear 312 
response to coherent motion in its preferred direction, a weak linear response to the randomly moving 313 
dots in the stimulus, and divisive normalization based on how much coherent motion the stimulus 314 
contained driving the other pools. The variance of each pool’s output scaled linearly with its mean. The 315 
net sensory evidence for each direction, calculated as the difference between one pool’s activity and the 316 
average activity of the other two, was then fed into an integrator, one for each possible choice. 317 
Whichever integrator reached a constant decision threshold first determined the choice, and the time of 318 
crossing the decision threshold the decision time. RT was modeled as the sum of the decision time and a 319 
fixed residual time, capturing the time needed for aspects of the task other than the decision itself, e.g., 320 
initiating an eye movement for reporting the choice. The structure of the model is shown in Figure 2. 321 
Further details can be found in Materials and Methods. 322 
If adding the secondary task of reporting a second guess did not alter the way subjects made their 323 
primary choice, the same model should still be able to capture the primary choice data and associated 324 
RTs from this experiment. To test this, we fitted the model (5 free parameters) to the mean RT data. The 325 
result of this fit is shown in Figure 3. Filled circles represent the data (with 95% confidence intervals, 326 
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calculated according to the method proposed by Goodman, 1965), lines the model. The motion strength 327 
of the strongest motion component in the stimulus is plotted on the horizontal axis, the color of 328 
symbols/lines reflects the strength of the other two motion components. The model clearly captures the 329 
structure of the mean RT data. If the model were perfect, at least 95% of the evaluated model mean RTs 330 
would be expected to be within the 95% confidence intervals associated with the data. Our model is 331 
close to that: 13 of the 15 mean RTs (87%) are inside, the two that are outside are still close to the 332 
confidence intervals. The estimated model parameters are summarized in Table 2. 333 
To further test whether the model can explain the primary choice data, we compared the model’s 334 
prediction for the distribution of primary choices with the actual distribution from the experiment 335 
(Figure 4). These data have not been used yet, because the model had only been fitted to mean RT data. 336 
The plotting conventions are similar to Figure 3. Circles indicate correct choices, squares choices of the 337 
direction that had intermediate support, and diamonds choices of the direction that had the weakest 338 
support. A perfect model would predict probabilities, at least 95% of which would be expected to be 339 
within the 95% confidence intervals associated with the data. While our model is not perfect, 18 of the 340 
23 probabilities (78%) are inside, the five that are outside are still close to the confidence intervals. The 341 
good agreement between data and model predictions indicates that the model introduced in Niwa and 342 
Ditterich (2008) is still able to explain the primary choice data and associated RTs from the current 343 
experiment. Thus, asking subjects to report a second guess apparently did not alter the structure of the 344 
decision process. 345 
 346 
The same computational model can also explain second guesses 347 
We have demonstrated earlier that subjects can produce informed second guesses when making 348 
perceptual decisions between multiple alternatives, but can we gain insight into what governs these 349 
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second guesses? The idea behind the highly successful integration-to-threshold models in perceptual 350 
decision-making is that decisionmakers accumulate sensory evidence for each of the possible choices 351 
until the accumulated evidence for one of them exceeds a decision threshold. How could a subject make 352 
an informed second guess in this framework? Assume the decisionmaker had access to the states of the 353 
integrators that did not win the race at the time of the threshold-crossing. What should the distribution 354 
of second guesses look like if subjects reported the integrator with the overall second-highest 355 
accumulated evidence as their second guess, or, equivalently, the option with the larger accumulated 356 
evidence out of the two remaining ones? We took the model, which had been fitted to the mean RTs 357 
associated with the primary choice and was able to explain the distribution of primary choices, and 358 
obtained the expected distributions of second guesses based on the overall second-highest accumulated 359 
evidence. 360 
A comparison between the predicted distributions of second guesses and the actual data on correct 361 
trials is shown in Figure 5. Symbols again represent the data (and 95% confidence intervals), lines reflect 362 
the model predictions. On correct trials, by definition, subjects have already reported the correct option 363 
as their primary choice. The correct option is therefore no longer available as a second guess. The 364 
relative frequency of reporting the correct option as the second guess (filled circles) has to be zero. The 365 
only interesting cases are those where the two weaker motion components had different motion 366 
strengths (purple and cyan).  Squares indicate how often subjects reported the direction with the 367 
intermediate motion strength as their second guess, diamonds how often the weakest motion 368 
component was reported. 369 
The same comparison, but now for error trials, is shown in Figure 6. In this case, the correct option can 370 
be reported as the second guess, and we had already seen earlier that, across experimental conditions, 371 
it was chosen more frequently than chance. The figure shows this relative frequency broken down by 372 
experimental condition (circles), adds the relative frequencies of reporting each incorrect option as the 373 
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second guess (squares and diamonds), and provides the model predictions for comparison. Why, in 374 
contrast to the plots we had seen so far, are the squares below the diamonds in this figure? When 375 
reporting their primary choice, subjects were more likely to make an error in favor of the motion 376 
component with intermediate support rather than picking the weakest component (see squares and 377 
diamonds in Figure 4). The weakest component (diamonds) was therefore available as an option for the 378 
second guess in substantially more error trials than the component with the intermediate support 379 
(squares), which explains why it was overall chosen more frequently. And why does the probability of 380 
reporting the direction of the strongest motion component (blue circles/line) not keep increasing 381 
monotonically as a function of motion strength? To make an error in a trial with only a single motion 382 
component with 40% coherence in the first place, the accumulated evidence for this direction has to be 383 
unusually low. As a consequence, since the second guess is based on the same accumulated evidence, 384 
there is also not a sufficient amount of evidence to support choosing this direction as the second guess. 385 
A perfect model would again predict probabilities, at least 95% of which would be expected to be within 386 
the 95% confidence intervals associated with the data. Across both correct and error trials and not 387 
counting the zero-probability events, 26 of the 31 predicted probabilities (84%) are inside, the five that 388 
are outside are still pretty close to the confidence intervals. Thus, there is good agreement between the 389 
data and model predictions, indicating that the reported second guesses are consistent with the idea 390 
that the decisionmaker has access to information about how much sensory evidence had been 391 
accumulated for competing unchosen options at the time when sufficient evidence had been collected 392 
to commit to a primary choice. 393 
In summary, a computational model with only five free parameters can account for 15 mean RTs, 16 394 
relative frequencies for the primary choice (not counting the 7 trivial cases of uniform choice 395 
distributions when all motion components are equally strong and the relative frequency of choosing the 396 
third option having to be one minus the sum of the relative frequencies of choosing the first or the 397 
20 
 
second option), and 18 relative frequencies for the second guess, again excluding the trivial cases. This 398 
strongly suggests that the primary choice and the second guess are produced by a common integration-399 
to-threshold decision process. 400 
 401 
Second guesses are best explained by the states of the integrators shortly after threshold crossing 402 
While the motion stimulus disappeared from the screen when the saccade for reporting the primary 403 
choice was detected, there is a delay between the decision threshold crossing and the saccade onset, 404 
and some stimulus information is also still in the visual cortical processing pipeline. In the decision 405 
confidence literature, it has been proposed that the decision confidence, which is usually reported after 406 
the choice, could be informed by sensory evidence that is processed after the choice has been made 407 
(Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Moran et al., 2015). To determine whether additional sensory evidence 408 
might have contributed to the reported second guesses in our experiment, we created a variant of the 409 
model, where the evidence accumulation was allowed to continue for a fixed period of time after the 410 
decision threshold had been crossed, before the non-winning integrators were read out to determine 411 
the second choice. Figure 7A shows the deviation between predicted and observed second guesses as a 412 
function of the additional integration time. Since the calculated points (blue circles) are simulation-413 
based and therefore slightly noisy, we added a robust polynomial interpolation (solid black line). The 414 
best match between predicted and observed second guesses (discrepancy of 0.027) is obtained for an 415 
additional integration time of 40 ms (dashed vertical line), i.e., when the integrators are read out shortly 416 
after the threshold crossing. The discrepancy clearly increases for longer additional integration times. 417 
Thus, the second guesses seem to be affected by a small amount of sensory evidence that is processed 418 
after the primary choice has been determined, but still largely rely on the same information, as typical 419 
decision times in our experiment are an order of magnitude larger. The predicted relative frequencies of 420 
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second guesses for a model with 40 ms of additional integration time are shown in Figures 7B and C. 421 
There is no major qualitative difference between these plots and Figures 5 and 6, the match between 422 
model predictions (lines) and data (symbols) is just slightly better. 423 
 424 
A model waiting for the same decision process to cross a second threshold can be ruled out 425 
To determine whether the second guesses could also be explained by alternative mechanisms that do 426 
not require reading out and comparing the accumulated evidence for the options that did not win the 427 
race to threshold, we considered several alternative models. First, we evaluated the possibility that the 428 
decision process could continue after the first threshold crossing until a second (different) threshold is 429 
crossed. The first threshold crossing would determine the primary choice, the second threshold crossing 430 
the second choice and the decision time. One can imagine that in situations where there is much 431 
stronger evidence for one particular choice compared to the other alternatives, such a second threshold 432 
crossing is unlikely to occur within a reasonable amount of time, in particular when the integration is 433 
perfect, and the decision bounds are fixed. We therefore also considered mechanisms with leaky 434 
integration and collapsing decision bounds (Ditterich, 2006). It turns out, however, that this class of 435 
models, even in the presence of leaky integration and collapsing bounds, makes one key qualitative 436 
prediction: decision times should increase, rather than decrease, when the evidence gets stronger. As a 437 
consequence, the best mean RT fit that can be obtained is largely flat as a function of motion strength, 438 
and the remaining error is about 6 times as large as the one for the fit shown in Fig. 3. Figure 8A shows 439 
this fitting attempt. This class of models can therefore be ruled out as an alternative explanation. 440 
 441 
  442 
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A model based on a second integration-to-threshold process for determining the second choice makes 443 
less accurate predictions for the distribution of second guesses 444 
We also considered the possibility that, as soon as the first threshold crossing occurs, a new decision 445 
process, only as a 2AFC between the two remaining options, is started. A threshold crossing of the 446 
second decision process would then determine the second choice and the decision time. When 447 
enforcing the same decision threshold as in the primary decision process, the remaining error after the 448 
mean RT fit is more than an order of magnitude larger than the one for the fit shown in Fig. 3. We 449 
therefore considered the possibility that the decision threshold for the second decision process could be 450 
lower. The mean RT fit reveals that the threshold would have to be very close to zero to be able to 451 
account for the pattern of RTs. A fit with a decision threshold of 0.052 (compared to 1 in the case of the 452 
first decision process) resulted in a remaining error that was only slightly larger than the one for the fit 453 
shown in Fig. 3. We therefore determined the predicted second guesses for this model (shown in 454 
Figure 8B and C). The discrepancy between predicted and observed second guesses, following the same 455 
convention as the one used in Fig. 7A, was 0.129 (red dashed line in Fig. 8D), about five times as big as 456 
the one for the model shown in Fig. 7B and C. Thus, this model also cannot capture the data pattern as 457 
well as our original model. 458 
 459 
A model based on a second, fixed-duration decision process for determining the second choice provides 460 
the second-best explanation for the distribution of second guesses 461 
As a final possibility, we considered that the second decision process might not be terminated by a 462 
threshold crossing, but rather end after a fixed amount of time. The process would be read out at that 463 
point, and the sign of the accumulated evidence would determine the second choice. The discrepancy 464 
between predicted and observed second guesses for this model, as a function of the duration of the 465 
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second decision process, is shown in Figure 8D. Since the calculated points (blue circles) are simulation-466 
based and therefore slightly noisy, we again added a robust polynomial interpolation (solid blue line). 467 
The best match is observed for an integration time of 70 ms, but the discrepancy is still 0.081, about 468 
three times as big as the one for the model shown in Fig. 7B and C (solid black in Fig. 8D). This model’s 469 
predictions for the second guesses are shown in Figures 8E and F. In contrast to our original model, 470 
which predicted the nonmonotonic relationship between motion strength and the probability of 471 
choosing the strongest motion component as the second guess on error trials (blue circles in Fig. 8F), 472 
this model predicts a monotonic relationship (blue line). This difference results from the fresh start of 473 
evidence accumulation in the second decision process, rather than the second guess being substantially 474 
affected by the accumulated evidence that led to the primary choice. Since 70 ms are needed for the 475 
second integration process, the residual time would be reduced to 593 ms in this case. While this model 476 
provides the second-best explanation, our original model still provides the better explanation for the 477 
observed pattern of second guesses. 478 
 479 
DISCUSSION 480 
We asked human subjects to make a perceptual decision among three alternatives and to report not 481 
only their primary choice, but also a second guess. Our data indicate that this second guess is not 482 
random, but clearly informed by the sensory evidence. A single integration-to-threshold model can not 483 
only explain the distribution of primary choices and the associated RTs, but also the distribution of 484 
second guesses. This suggests that the second guess is generated based on largely the same 485 
accumulated evidence that is also used to produce the primary choice. The second guess appears to be 486 
governed by the ranking of the amounts of evidence that have been accumulated by the integrators that 487 
did not win the race to threshold, which are apparently accessible. 488 
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We also considered alternative models. The only other model that was able to largely capture the data 489 
pattern, although not as well as the model based on reading out the states of the integrators that had 490 
not crossed the decision threshold yet shortly after the winning integrator crossing its threshold, was a 491 
model based on starting a new decision process when the threshold crossing determining the primary 492 
choice occurred. The process had to be set up as a decision between the remaining alternatives and 493 
read out after a fixed amount of time (about 70 ms). 494 
 495 
Relationship with decision confidence 496 
Human subjects can not only report their choice when making a perceptual decision, but also express a 497 
level of confidence in their decision. A substantial body of literature has been devoted to how well 498 
calibrated this decision confidence is and how it might be computed. Ideally, the level of confidence 499 
should match the accuracy of the decision. However, this is typically not the case, and human subjects 500 
have been reported to be either under- or overconfident, depending on the difficulty of the decision 501 
(see Rahnev and Denison, 2018 for a review). Confidence clearly is informed by the available sensory 502 
evidence, but how? Vickers (1979) suggested that it depends on the balance of evidence. The more 503 
dissimilar the amounts of evidence in favor of the available options are at the time of making a decision, 504 
the more confident the observer can be about the choice. This information can be extracted from the 505 
decision process itself. While the idea is incompatible with the popular 1-dimensional drift-diffusion 506 
model for 2-alternative forced choices, which is equivalent to a race between two accumulators that 507 
receive perfectly anti-correlated instantaneous net evidence and, as a consequence, always has the 508 
losing integrator in an identical state when the winning integrator exceeds the decision threshold, it can 509 
be applied to alternative models. For example, Ditterich (2006) demonstrated that a model based on 510 
partially anti-correlated accumulators provides a better account of decision-related activity in the 511 
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parietal association cortex of monkeys performing a perceptual decision task. Neurons coding for the 512 
losing alternative do not show a stereotyped activity level when the neurons coding for the winning 513 
alternative reach threshold. This information could be used to inform confidence. Moreno-Bote (2010) 514 
formalized how confidence can be extracted from diffusion models with partially correlated integrators. 515 
An alternative mechanism was proposed by Smith and Vickers (1988). According to their model, only 516 
one of the integrators is updated at a particular time, the one receiving positive instantaneous net 517 
sensory evidence, which also results in the losing accumulator being in different states when the 518 
winning accumulator reaches threshold. 519 
Gaining neurophysiological insights into the neural mechanism underlying decision confidence from 520 
animal experiments is challenging, as animals cannot be asked directly to provide an explicit confidence 521 
rating. However, animal tasks have been developed, which require the animal to produce a behavior 522 
that should be informed by decision confidence (see Hanks and Summerfield, 2017 for a review). For 523 
example, Kiani and Shadlen (2009) trained monkeys to make a perceptual decision between two 524 
alternatives. In a random subset of trials, the researchers offered a third option, a sure bet resulting in a 525 
smaller, but certain reward, whereas the animals could gain a larger reward if they engaged in a choice 526 
and reported the correct option. The animals were more likely to choose the sure bet the weaker the 527 
sensory evidence (motion coherence) was and the shorter they were allowed to watch the motion 528 
stimulus. Importantly, decision-related neurons in parietal association cortex that have the signature of 529 
carrying accumulated evidence showed either strong or weak activation when the animal engaged in a 530 
choice, but intermediate activation when opting for the sure bet, suggesting that the information 531 
encoded in these neurons does not only govern choice, but also inform confidence. The study further 532 
suggested that decision confidence does not only depend on accumulated evidence, but also on elapsed 533 
time, which was confirmed explicitly in a later human psychophysics experiment (Kiani et al., 2014) and 534 
is also formalized in Moreno-Bote’s (2010) model. Animal experiments on decision confidence have 535 
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received some criticism, primarily claiming that the tasks could potentially be solved without requiring 536 
any meta-cognition, for example, by treating tasks with a sure bet as a multi-alternative decision task 537 
(Insabato et al., 2016, 2017). However, Kepecs and Mainen (2012) pointed out that the same scrutiny 538 
should then also be applied to human tasks. 539 
The view that confidence is governed by the same information that determines the choice and, in 540 
particular, by the balance of evidence has been challenged by experiments that found that confidence 541 
primarily relies on response-congruent evidence (Zylberberg et al., 2012; Maniscalco et al., 2016). The 542 
authors reported that, while choices in their experiments were governed by the balance of evidence, 543 
confidence was primarily determined by the amount of evidence for the chosen option and largely 544 
insensitive to the amount of evidence for the non-chosen alternative. Dual stage or second-order 545 
models are also at odds with the idea that choice and confidence rely on the same information (Pleskac 546 
and Busemeyer, 2010; Moran et al., 2015; Fleming and Daw, 2017). These models posit that confidence 547 
ratings rely on a post-decision process that is informed by the outcome of the decision process, but not 548 
exclusively. 549 
Different studies have therefore found the information upon which choice and decision confidence are 550 
based to overlap to varying degrees. We have addressed a similar question for the mechanism 551 
underlying second guesses. Our results indicate that the distribution of second guesses is most 552 
compatible with a decision mechanism that largely uses the same accumulated evidence for 553 
determining both the primary and the second choice. We found the best match between model 554 
predictions and data, when the decision process was allowed to continue for a very short period of time 555 
(compared to typical decision times in our experiment), about 40 ms, after the threshold crossing 556 
determining the primary choice, before the states of the remaining integrators are read out to 557 
determine the second choice. 558 
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 559 
Second guessing in other cognitive functions 560 
In 1961, Signal Detection Theory (SDT) was still in its infancy and competing with the prevailing “high 561 
threshold” model of sensory perception, Swets and colleagues published a paper proposing that a 562 
second-choice paradigm in multi-interval signal detection could help distinguishing between the 563 
competing ideas (Swets et al., 1961). However, second-choice paradigms have not been pursued further 564 
in the area of perceptual decision-making, in particular not since the field has turned to sequential 565 
sampling models to explain not only choices, but also decision times. Instead, Swets et al.’s proposal got 566 
picked up in the memory literature, there typically referred to as a 4AFC-2R (four-alternative forced 567 
choice with two responses) paradigm, as the field was also debating whether recognition memory was 568 
best described by a threshold process or by a continuous memory strength process. Parks and 569 
Yonelinas (2009) used a second-choice paradigm to gather experimental evidence beyond the Receiver 570 
Operating Characteristic analysis that the field had relied on previously. Kellen and Klauer (2011) 571 
followed up with a more detailed model-based analysis. Earlier, second guesses had already been used 572 
to study mechanisms underlying the effect of misinformation on memory recall (Wright et al., 1996). 573 
More recently, second guesses have also been used to study conflict detection mechanisms in reasoning 574 
(Bago et al., 2019). 575 
 576 
Second guesses as a tool for studying knowledge about the decision process 577 
We have shown that human subjects can produce informed second guesses when making perceptual 578 
decisions between multiple alternatives and that these second choices follow a distribution that would 579 
be expected if they were governed by the relative amounts of accumulated net sensory evidence for 580 
each option at the time of the largest accumulated evidence reaching a bound. Second-choice 581 
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paradigms therefore cannot only be used in the context of SDT, as they have in the past, but also with 582 
accumulation-of-evidence frameworks. In addition to decision confidence, the study of second guesses 583 
provides another useful tool for gaining insight into the decision process and what information a 584 
decisionmaker has access to about the outcome of a decision, beyond the discrete choice. Similar to the 585 
neurophysiological work on decision confidence, we expect future studies to be able to establish a link 586 
between second guesses and underlying neural activity. 587 
 588 
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Table 1. List of motion coherence combinations 660 
Motion coherence of first 
component [%] 
Motion coherence of second 
component [%] 
Motion coherence of third 
component [%] 
0 0 0 
5 0 0 
0 5 0 
0 0 5 
10 0 0 
0 10 0 
0 0 10 
20 0 0 
0 20 0 
0 0 20 
40 0 0 
0 40 0 
0 0 40 
10 10 10 
20 10 10 
10 20 10 
10 10 20 
30 10 10 
10 30 10 
10 10 30 
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20 15 5 
20 5 15 
15 20 5 
5 20 15 
15 5 20 
5 15 20 
30 15 5 
30 5 15 
15 30 5 
5 30 15 
15 5 30 
5 15 30 
20 20 20 
30 20 20 
20 30 20 
20 20 30 
40 20 20 
20 40 20 
20 20 40 
30 25 15 
30 15 25 
25 30 15 
15 30 25 
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25 15 30 
15 25 30 
40 25 15 
40 15 25 
25 40 15 
15 40 25 
25 15 40 
15 25 40 
 661 
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Table 2. Best-fitting model parameters 663 
Model parameters Parameter values 
g   0.0103 
nk   0.197 
sk   0.616 
vk   0.329 
Residual time (ms) 663 
 664 
  665 
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 666 
 667 
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. Human subjects were asked to determine the strongest motion 668 
direction in a random-dot pattern with multiple motion components. They were free to watch the 669 
stimulus as long as they wanted and responded with a goal-directed eye movement to one of three 670 
choice targets to indicate their primary choice. Choices and RTs were measured. After indicating their 671 
primary choice, subjects were instructed to make a second goal-directed eye movement to one of the 672 
remaining two targets to indicate a second guess. 673 
  674 
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 675 
 676 
Figure 2. Computational model. Three integrators (each associated with one of the three alternatives) 677 
race against each other. The integrator output signal ( 1i , 2i , or 3i ) reaching a decision threshold first 678 
determines the primary choice and terminates the decision process. The integrator input signals ( 1e , 2e , 679 
and 3e ) are net evidence signals, which are linear combinations of the three relevant sensory signals  680 
( 1s , 2s , and 3s ). Solid arrows indicate positive weights (excitatory connections), and dashed arrows 681 
indicate negative weights (inhibitory connections). The second guess is determined by the rank ordering 682 
of the remaining two integrators when the winning one reaches threshold. 683 
  684 
38 
 
 685 
 686 
Figure 3. Mean response time data and fitted model. The symbols represent the measured mean RTs for 687 
all unique combinations of motion strengths. The motion strength of the strongest component is plotted 688 
on the horizontal axis. Colors indicate the motion strengths of the two weaker motion components. (For 689 
example, the cyan point at 40% motion strength indicates the mean RT for stimuli with the three motion 690 
components having strengths of 40%, 25%, and 15%, respectively.) Some points have been shifted 691 
slightly horizontally to reduce graphical overlap. For example, all points within the gray bar centered on 692 
20% have a strength of the strongest motion component of exactly 20%. Error bars indicate 95% 693 
confidence intervals. The lines connect the mean RTs from the computational model. 694 
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 695 
 696 
Figure 4. Comparison between the relative frequencies of primary choices and model predictions. 697 
Symbols again reflect the data, with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. The lines connect 698 
the relative frequencies predicted by the computational model. Circles indicate choices of the target 699 
associated with the strongest motion component (correct primary choices), squares choosing the target 700 
associated with the component with intermediate motion strength, and diamonds choosing the target 701 
associated with the weakest motion component. Other conventions as in Fig. 3. The dashed line 702 
indicates chance performance. 703 
  704 
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 705 
 706 
Figure 5. Comparison between relative frequencies of second guesses on correct trials (symbols, with 707 
error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals) and model predictions (lines). Conventions as in Fig. 4. 708 
Note that on correct trials the target associated with the strongest motion component has been 709 
reported as the primary choice and is not available for the second guess. Therefore, all circles are 710 
located at a relative frequency of zero. 711 
  712 
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 714 
Figure 6. Comparison between relative frequencies of second guesses on error trials (symbols, with 715 
error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals) and model predictions (lines). Conventions as in Fig. 5. 716 
How often the correct target (circles) was reported as the second choice varied across experimental 717 
conditions, but was overall significantly above chance (63%). 718 
  719 
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 720 
Figure 7. Predictions for second guesses when integration is allowed to continue after the threshold 721 
crossing. A. Discrepancy between predicted and observed second guesses as a function of additional 722 
integration time before the accumulated evidence is read out. A minimum (best match) is observed at 723 
40 ms. B. Predicted second guesses on correct trials with 40 ms additional integration time (same format 724 
as Fig. 5). C. Predicted second guesses on error trials with 40 ms additional integration time (same 725 
format as Fig. 6).  726 
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 727 
Figure 8. Alternative models. A. Mean RT fit for a model that waits for a second threshold crossing, but 728 
allowing leaky integration and collapsing bounds (same format as Fig. 3). B. Predicted second guesses on 729 
correct trials for a model that starts a new 2AFC decision process to determine the second choice and 730 
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waits for a threshold crossing, but allowing a lower threshold than in the primary decision process (same 731 
format as Fig. 5). C. Like B, but for error trials (same format as Fig. 6). D. Discrepancy between predicted 732 
and observed second guesses as a function of integration time for a model that starts a new 2AFC 733 
decision process to determine the second choice and reads the process out after a fixed amount of time 734 
(blue). A minimum (best match) is observed at 70 ms. For comparison, the curve for the original model 735 
(black) and the value for the model with a low threshold (red) are also shown. E. Predicted second 736 
guesses on correct trials for a model that starts a new 2AFC decision process to determine the second 737 
choice and integrates the sensory evidence for 70 ms before the process is read out (same format as 738 
Fig. 5). F. Like E, but for error trials (same format as Fig. 6). 739 
 740 
